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Supreme Court of the United States

October Term, 1970

No. 1149

WILLIAM J. DAVENPORT,

Petitioner,

vs.

CITY RENT and REHABILITATION ADMINISTRATION of the City of New York, JOHN V. LINDSAY, as Mayor of the City of New York,

Respondents.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

WILLIAM J. DAVENPORT, *Pro Se*
324 Allaire Avenue
Leonia, New Jersey 07605
(201) 944-1174

LUTZ APPELLATE PRINTERS, INC.
Law and Financial Printing

South River, N.J. (201) 257-6850
New York, N.Y. (212) 563-2121
Philadelphia, Pa. (215) 563-5587

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To the Chief Justice and the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court of The United States

Your petitioner, WILLIAM J. DAVENPORT, petitions for a Writ of Certiorari to review the dismissal without trial of petitioner's complaint(s) seeking an original hearing to determine the facts, and applicable law, of support for orders of the New York City Rent Control Administrator.

The present complaint 70 CIV 1011, appeal No. 35902, was dismissed without appeal court hearing or opinion on motions of procedure. The complaint had been dismissed without trial as res judicata of a prior action 68 CIV 4984 which

similarly had been dismissed without trial on procedural cross motions. The court apparently not having in either action recognized petitioner's complaint obscured by preconceptions and confusion advanced by respondent.

Petitioner hereto, seeking to maintain ownership, and supply residential service of rental to tenants of an apartment building subject to New York City Rent Control laws, seeks necessary review of summary orders of the Rent Administrators based entirely upon "the opinion of the administrator," without determination of the facts. Which are presumptive and in error as stated in Administrative orders, which have been termed "within the provision of law" by the New York State Supreme Court, petitioners prior complaint, 68 CIV 4984 was dismissed without trial by U.S. District Judge John M. Cannella on July 25, 1969 stating the complaint as presented insufficient to justify federal trial. Appeals Court decision No. 345 affirming the decision on Dec. 29, 1969 stating two causes of the "insufficiency."

The present action intended as correction was dismissed by Judge Charles Tenney on May 11, 1970 without trial, stating RES JUDICATA of the former action.

Thus there has never been any hearing to examine the law, or determine the facts either at court proceedings or administrative level. The consequence of the Administrative orders deprive petitioner of his property, and thus far have obstructed the procedures of lawful petition and redress. Petitioner herein seeks to attain the benefits provided by the specifications of the in-

volved Rent Control Law, and secured by Constitutional warrantees of Art's 1, 2, 4 and 5; and amendments thereto 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 13 and 14.

Opinions Below

There was no opinion stated by the Appeals court.

The memorandum No. 36779 of District Court Judge Charles Tenney of May 11, 1969 states "...to permit maintenance of the present action would do violence to the wholesome principle of res judicata and its purpose to terminate litigation where parties have had full opportunity to be heard on the merits of their respective claims. ... Even assuming that plaintiff has touched upon some additional argument in his present complaint, the prior decisions on the merits... foreclose relitigation....

Accordingly, plaintiff's motion for injunctive relief is denied and defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint herein and to quash the plaintiff's subpoena duces tecum are granted." The complaint was dismissed without trial.

Reference of res judicata to 68 CIV 4984; similarly dismissed without trial on cross motions of procedure by U.S. District Court Judge John M. Cannella, memorandum No. 36038 on July 29, 1969 the court's statement shows error of judicial reference and concern in the footnote reference to a law non-existent at the time of decontrol.

"Rent Control Law,"[1] to be —:

"1. Title Y, Ch 51 of the N.Y. City Admin Code.

As to the claim of lack of due process of law with respect to the plaintiff's decontrol proceedings the court finds that the requirements of due process have been met by adequate proceedings and judicial review in the state court. Further the court determines that the complaint is without merit and lacks the substantiality requisite to the institution of a federal claim."

In both of the foregoing dismissals, the courts simultaneously quashed petitioner's subpoena(s) duces tecum by which petitioner sought original access to the original records, continually kept secret by respondent, that the considerations of the court might have been more informed of the facts.

This decision was appealed, Docket No. 34027, on Dec. 5, 1969 before Justices Waterman, Hays and Feinberg, of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, whose decision on Dec. 29, 1969 No 345 while affirming the lower court stated:

"To the extent that the complaint and papers allege loss of money or property rights, absent racial discrimination, they gave the district court no sufficient basis for determining that plaintiff's claim met the jurisdictional minimum of either 28 U.S.C. §1331 or U.S.C. §1332 and did not meet the requirements minimum of either 28 U.S.C. §1343,...mere supporting statements:..., without supporting facts, are not sufficient. ..."

A further opinion of the N.Y.S. Supreme Court in reference did not consider the question before it, having erroneously accepted the statement of defendant as proven fact, and having stated as cause and fact of determination in the published finding of the court a totally unsubstantiated, false, and unrelated allegation of defense counsel which was contrary to the prior finding of defendant Rent Administrator. The court's decision being further based upon law which did not exist at the time in question. The appeal within the New York Courts was denied without opinion.

The opinions are all attached hereto in the appendix.

Jurisdiction

Jurisdiction of this court is sought as a last resort, petitioner believing the lower courts to have acted precipitiously and in error where jurisdiction does in fact reside with the federal courts both in consequence of the constitutional and civil rights of petitioner infringed under color of law as prohibited by Art. 1, Sec. 10, cl 1; and the 14th amendment thegeof, and 28 U.S.C. Chap. 155, Sections 2281, 2283, and 2284.

Jurisdiction is also claimed by diversity of citizenship in that petitioner is a citizen of the State of New Jersey, defendant is an agent of the State of New York and City of New York, and the value involved is severally more than ten thousand dollars ($10,000.00); under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1331 and 1332, and 1343.

Jurisdiction is also sought under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1981, 1982, 1983, 1984 and 1985. In that petitioner is a black person and seeks to demonstrate that he is being discriminated against on the basis of his black identification and the previous condition of his ancestors in slavery, which would be contrary to the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution.

Original Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts derives from the treaty rights of this petitioner as a citizen of the United States, and entitled thereby to the treaty provisions of United Nations Charter guaranteeing his rights to own and use real property.

The date of dismissal of petitioners complaint without opinion by the U.S. Appeals Court for the Second Circuit was September 24, 1970, the orders were entered on Docket No. 35002 on September 25, 1970.

The prior memorandum of dismissal No. 36779 of 70 CIV 1011, by Judge Charles Tenney was dated and filed May 11, 1970.

Questions Presented

1. Did the District Court improperly apply the principle of res judicata to deny petitioner a first opportunity of trial, a first opportunity to a hearing of his complaint, and simultaneously quash petitioners subpoena duces tecum by which he sought first access to the essential records upon which the complaint is made and the action based?

2. Has the petitioner been continually denied

necessary due process provided by law and required to determine the facts relative to his complaint?

3. Has New York City unlawfully seized, confiscated, and assigned the lawful property of petitioner to third parties without cause, without warrant, without oath or affirmation, and without in fact describing or even admitting the fact of seizure?

4. Is the Administration and Enforcement of the New York City Rent Control Law consistent with its specifications of purpose, requirements and responsibility, as provided within the law and by constitutional authority.

The Facts

The facts have not yet been entered into the official records available to this court. Original errors of the New York City Rent Administration have been made a part of the official records without petitioner's knowledge, or opportunity of reply or correction. Administrative action and orders thereupon without proper procedure for determination of the actual facts has been contrary to law, and destructive in the extreme to petitioner. No provision in any so-called review has permitted petitioner examination or opportunity to correct these errors which have been hidden with bureaucratic efficiency using thereto the full force of government.

Petitioner, pro se, is a novice to court procedures and form, and while seeking to comply with the court rule of brevity must attempt to penetrate and set aside a murk of confusion and

error continually presented and maintained by defendant counsel in error or ignorance which has hidden the facts that are the cause and core of this action.

The primary consideration and basic question of all considerations hereto are of original fact and applicable law, which should have been determined and stated at the lowest administrative level. This has not been done. There was no hearing, no access to information of cause, question, opportunity thereby of reply, or statement of consequence by the responsible defendant Rent Administrators office to petitioner. There has continually occurred since that time, gratitious insertions of new, false and totally unsubstantiated allegations by defense counsel, which appear to have been taken from statements of previous court decisions in other cases, and inserted in briefs before the courts solely to obtain repetitive performance by the courts in a state of confusion.

This procedure of defendant counsel, combined with the fact that petitioner has continually been denied access to the records, and is unaware of the rules and methods of court determinings, has served to elicit considerations and determinations by the courts on presentments not concurrent with reality.

Petitioner therefore seeks to present essential background of related fact, and the facts from circumstance known to him as the involved principal and witness to the facts in the most concise form of which he is capable.

This matter was before the District Court on

a motion for a Temporary Restraining Order in the action 70 CIV 1011, and dismissed without trial; the court stating res judicata of 69 CIV 4984, which similarly before the court on a motion for a Temporary Restraining Order, was dismissed without trial.

Petitioner, owns and seeks to operate a small apartment building consisting of eight six room apartments, located in the Bronx New York, and subject to the provisions of Rent Control laws which originating in 1943 as Wartime Price and Wage Controls by the Federal Government, have been continued since 1949 by the State of New York. The stated purpose of these laws is to prevent excesses and abuses of the market in rental housing. The law is economic in nature, and during these 27 years the economy has changed. The official study by the Rand Corporation made for the City of New York and released in 1970 indicates that during this period costs have increased six percent (6%) annually while controlled rents have increased only two percent (2%) annually. Computation thus indicates that in 1970 controlled rents have decreased to only fifty seven percent (57%) of the necessary maintenance and operating costs.

Petitioner, subject to the foregoing circumstance, has sought to know and is totally unaware today, of any failure to comply with the involved law. He has been subject to rulings and orders of the Rent Administrator(s) which deny him the provisions of necessary relief specified within the involved law. The law requires procedures of administrative examination where basic questions of fact exist, assigning the Rent Administrator the

responsibility of effecting the basic intent of the law, without specifying the exact procedures.

The simple blatant fact of this case is that petitioner has as not yet been allowed access to the involved records upon which all legal action herein depends, and upon which the involved orders are based. Petitioner has been unable to obtain any hearing in which charges against him have been stated, witnesses produced and examined under oath, or even face to face conference on the charges with any Rent Administration official. Nor has petitioner been able to obtain factual statements in written form from the Rent Administration of the basic status of his affairs as regulated, in a manner providing him with necessary security with which to enter either contracts or the courts as required to maintain his business.

The immediate consequence is that this case arrives in this high court in a state of continued confusion, where the facts and the law have been hidden, suppressed, and obscured. Petitioner's purpose before this court is to penetrate that confusion, expose the facts, and correct the record, that the law might be maintained. However, in the history of these proceedings, at every stage, the Rent Administrator, directly or through the performance of his attorney in court, has in some manner prevented such an opening of the record for examination and correction. Thus the Rent Administrator(s) have continually suppressed and hidden the facts which the law requires him to determine and expose.

Petitioner comes before this court with three general complaints, chronologically within the story:

Petitioner, a Negro, having sailed during World War II as a Merchant Marine Radio Officer, had extreme difficulty locating adequate employment ashore during the 1947-54 period, and in direct consequence thereof, seeking to establish his own business and needing a credit background, in 1954 purchased the involved building, which constructed in 1900 of brick and stone with wood interior, was structurally sound requiring normal maintenance for its age.

Petitioner, personally managing the building during 1954-1955 found that operating costs of $7,200 could not be met by controlled rents of $5,900 annually, and sought to obtain the "insufficient return" increase provided by law. The application was denied on the basis of Rent Control Administration accounting which rejected as "policy" all handwritten receipts out of hand; actual janitorial costs being substituted by an "allowance" which was less than lawfully required minimum wages and the cost of insurance; and amortized furnace repairs over eight years as a "capital improvement." Petitioner sought the Administrator's review mandated, upon request, by law. The "review" provided consisted solely of the same accountant reviewing his own work and approving it. Legal redress was at that time not sought due to the costs of litigation. This is one of petitioner's complaints and included properly only in 70 CIV 1011.

Petitioner still seeking to obtain needed operating funds for the building from rents, as the tenants moved out, sought to use Section 2(2)(h) of the New York State Emergency Rent Control Law as amended in 1954, which provided release from

control (decontrol) of apartments upon re-rental after one year of owner occupancy. Therefore petitioner moved into and out of these apartments for the prescribed period of time between 1955 and 1960 in accordance with the information provided by the New York State Rent Control Commission official personnel. Proper notification on forms provided by the State Rent Control Commission were duly filled, and properly filed. The information was examined by official personnel of the State Rent Commission and accepted with approval, however as Rent Commission policy no statements in writing were supplied the owners. Rents were set in these "decontrolled" apartments at free market rates, consistent with operating costs.

Subsequent to this in 1962, New York State generally discarded Rent Controls, permitting their retention in, and assigning administration to, New York City. Regulations, policy, procedure, and administrative supervisory personnel were changed at this time.

In 1963, petitioner received a postcard notification from the new New York City Rent Administration District Office that his "applications" were assigned docket numbers. By this reference the prior "Notices of Statutory Decontrol" were being reclassified as "applications." Thus New York State Docket DR-3974 was labeled 2AD-2248, DR-5420 labeled 2AD-2249, DR-6643 labeled 2AD-2250, and DR-7855 labeled 2AD-2251. What is not stated is that reference in the former dockets are to provisions of the NEW YORK STATE "Emergency Housing Rent Control Law, amended 1955," Section 2(2)(h) of the act; and that the new

reference is intended to apply to totally different provisions of changes made in the subsequent New York City Public Law No. 20 of 1962 (N.Y.C. Adm. Code, Ch. 51, Title Y.)

Subsequent to this in 1964, the District Rent Director, first sent notices to tenants and petitioner's attorney, but not to petitioner that the "reports on statutory decontrol were to be revoked, and prior rents re-established..." (stating various grounds intended), and later sent notices that this had been done, stating "Landlord's Report on Statutory Decontrol DR-...is revoked," and that rents were re-instated as of the date of decontrol. Throughout this period petitioner sought and was denied relevant information, official contact, hearing or other first hand knowledge necessary to clarify the situation, but was by administrative order refused and denied, and forced to deal through the inadequate services of attorney, through whom pertinent information was not passed.

In January 1965, petitioner through his attorney, sought administrative review as mandated upon request by the Rent Control Laws. In December 1965 the New York City Rent Administrator without further investigation, without hearing, without any contact in which petitioner was accorded information or opportunity to be heard, issued a statement supporting the action of the District Rent Director. Thus petitioner was denied the Administrative review required by law, the Rent Administrator not even seeking to know the grounds or cause of petitioner's complaint.

Petitioner's second complaint hereto derives; that these orders of the Rent Administrator are

(1) without authority of law, being a review of statutory performance falsely stated to be original examination of applications; (2) seek to apply ex-post-facto provisions of law to acts prior to their existence; (3) that petitioner was denied due process of law, and that the facts were not determined; (4) that the District Rent Office Director and New York City Rent Administrator in these orders seized by indirect procedure of assignment, the rent monies lawfully belonging to petitioner; (5) by the implication necessary to the facts of law upon which authority was claimed, petitioner was accused of perjury and fraudulent filing, which is a felony under the laws of the State of New York. Petitioner was held responsible by these orders for penalties thereof contrary to the laws section 4 for a criminal act to the extent of thousands of dollars, and contrary to the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution was denied opportunity of defense or public trial. (6) By effect of the terms of the order petitioner was in fact held responsible to pay penalties to the tenants, for alleged breaches of contract which if true would have been the act of the tenants, solely because petitioner was the landlord, which is an order of attainder contrary to constitutional prohibitions. (7) That inasfar as the law itself is police authority of the State of New York, it is limited in use by purpose to necessary application to obtain the intent stated. No such limitation of use has been here recognized by any representative of the Rent Administration.

Subsequent to 1964, petitioner has sought Rent Administration approval of rent increases in various apartments in the subject building consistent with operating costs, under Section (x) 33.4 stating

low rents under unusual circumstances, of the New York City Rent Regulations of 1962, but in each instance petitioner has been denied consideration of his application on one pretext or another. This is petitioner's third complaint, and stated only in 70 CIV 1011.

Petitioner in 1966, through attorney(s) sought review of the Rent Administrator's orders in the New York State Courts. The original action was defective through inadequate presentation by petitioner's attorney, but the determination of the court was based on a new, false, totally unsubstantiated, and unknown-to-petitioner-at-that-time claim originated by the Corporation Counsel of the City of New York; which the court included in its statement of decision as the reason for the decision. This statement was contrary to the prior findings of the Rent Administrator, the claim being that petitioner had "sought to create an appearance only, but never really lived in the apartments."

Petitioner has never been able to examine, either prior to, during, or subsequently, the file presented in evidence to this court. Petitioner personally knows the inaccuracy of statements in the opposition briefs was denied direct reply to the record on the specific instructions and orders of Maurice Reichman, as the then Chief Counsel for the New York City Rent Administration.

An appeal to the Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court was dismissed without any statement of opinion.

A complaint instituted in the federal courts as a class action by an attorney in 68 CIV 4984,

sought both to bring the individual questions of petitioner before the court and contest the constitutionality of the Rent Control Law as administered. The court indicated no recognition of the individual factors of petitioner's case, or the elements questioning Administration of the Rent Control Law. The court accepted the opposition definition of petitioner's complaint, treating the claim as subject to the New York City Regulations promulgated in 1962 without question. The complaint was dismissed without trial on a cross-motion of defense by Judge Cannella, who stated the case filed as insufficient for federal trial. Appeal Justices Waterman, Hays, and Feinberg sustained the lower court, specifying elements of insufficiency of presentation.

Petitioner, now financially depleted, sought to enter necessary corrected action before the court as 70 CIV 1011. Attempting to correct the causes of dismissal of the earlier action the necessary information specifying the cost involvement necessary for U.S.C. Title 28, Sec. 1331 & 1332 was included, class action was dropped, and petitioner's additional third ground of complaint was included. Petitioner continually suffering losses induced by the existant orders of the defendant Rent Administrator sought relief during the pendency of the action, by a Temporary Restraining Order. The court instead, dismissed the action as "Res Judicata" of the prior action, noting the additional claims and discounting them, simultaneously quashing petitioner's subpoena duces tecum by which he still sought first access to the original public records upon which all this is based.

Petitioner, thereupon filed on June 20, 1970 appeal Docket No. 35002 with the United States

Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. The application by petitioner for five additional days to file papers was answered by an opposition cross motion to dismiss on July 13, 1970. Petitioner's papers with the court's approval were filed on July 27, 1970, including the brief, appendix, and Motion for Temporary Injunction and Restraining Order.

On July 28, 1970 United States Circuit Judge Leonard P. Moore ordered: "It is hereby ordered that appellant's motion be consolidated with his appeal to be considered by the panel hearing the appeal and that his papers may be filed as is."

On August 19, 1970, Chief Justice of the Appeals Court for the Second Circuit J. Edward Lumbard, signed and the court clerk filed an order granting an ex-parte application by appellee Rent Administration, which had not previously been entered on the docket, and of which petitioner-appellant had received no notice or service. This order granted appellee 30 days to file subsequent to decision of the court upon appellee's motion to dismiss. The effect was to reverse the order of Judge Moore and require that petitioner present his full argument without ever having seen even the original Administration Record, and thereafter should the court concede cause for the complaint, appellee would have thirty days to invent further claims and allegations which could not then be disavowed by appellant.

Petitioner thereupon entered a motion to vacate the above order. Further on September 3, 1970, with a foreclosure application of the mortgage company now in the New York Supreme Court,

petitioner again sought a Temporary Restraining Order. On September 24, 1970, petitioner discovered that this application had been altered as docketed to request dismissal of Judge Leonard Moore's prior order supposedly at the request of appellant, by the office of the Clerk of the Court without petitioner's knowledge or authority.

Petitioner thereupon telephoned Judge Hays' secretary, seeking to delay action by the court, and obtain a hearing upon all this which procedurally destroyed his position before the court. As of that day, the motions in the file were all decided against petitioner to dismiss his appeal without opinion. These papers were docketed on September 25, 1970. From the foregoing it should be evident that the procedure within the appeals court was utter confusion.

Thus petitioner enters this Nation's highest Court, still seeking an original hearing in which questions and issues may be disclosed, charges stated, evidence and witnesses impartially examined under oath, and that he may have opportunity to be heard and enter his statements and claims into the record; that the facts might be determined to permit necessary considerations and give the true authority of law to administrative orders resultant therefrom. This Court is asked herein to provide the hearing which should have occurred in the lowest administrative office, at the earliest possible date. But which has not occurred, although defendant attorneys have continually sought successfully to mislead the Court into the presumptive error that it had, by statements and allusions of reference apparently thereto.

Petitioner as of this date, is in the federal courts seeking to forstall and prevent mortgage foreclosure and total loss of his years of effort and financial investment in this property. Which foreclosure action is the direct result of the Rent Administrator's orders contested herein, and the facts in brief are these.

Petitioner obtained a Certificate of Eviction to clear Apartment No. 1. The hearing thereto was on February 2, 1955 with the Certificate issued July 13, 1955. The tenant therein having departed in August 1955. Petitioner took occupancy placing his belongings therein in late August 1955. Petitioner actually took residency therein on September 5, 1955. Petitioner having agreed to re-rental upon departure to a friend living with him as roomer, sought information toward filing decontrol notice on October 14, 1957 at the New York State Rent Control Office. At that time he was informed by clerks and a hearing officer of the Commission that he could file rental any date subsequent to July 13, 1957. For the convenience of not repeating a trip to that office, the date for rent collection of the 15th of the previous month was used.

Thus the Certificate of Eviction had been obtained for more than two years and one month by any count. Petitioner had occupied the apartment for two years and two months actually residing therein for over two years on October 14, 1957.

The Rent Administrator's "NOTICE OF COMMENCEMENT OF PROCEEDING TO DETERMINE FACTS OR FIX MAXIMUM RENTS [Section 36]" dated July 27, 1964 informed the tenant, the there-

in Mr. & Mrs. William Watts, in statement No. 9. "Maximum legal rent proposed is the registered rent, which remains" (i.e. — 1955 rental of $55. a month). "NOTE: Landlord's Report on Statutory Decontrol [2DR-3974] is to be revoked. The record indicates that it does not meet the two year requirement after the issuance of a Certificate of Eviction. . . ."

The requirement referred to is Section 2 (2) (h) of the amended New York State Emergency Housing Rent Control Law of 1955.

> "Housing accommodations which are rented after April 1, 1953 and have been continuously occupied by the owner thereof for a period of one year prior to the date of renting; provided, however, that this paragraph shall not apply where the owner acquired possession of the housing accommodation after the issuance of a certificate of eviction pursuant to the Rent and Eviction Regulations within the two year period immediately preceding the date of such renting, and provided further, that this exemption shall remain effective only so long as the housing accommodations are not rented for other than single family occupancy."

It is obvious in the foregoing that the condition of law is met, and the administrative presumption is in error, which states intent at the "COMMENCEMENT OF PROCEEDINGS. . . ."

In August 1964 the tenant refused to pay the rent, and was given a dispossess notice. On August 15, 1964 a suspicious origin fire occurred

in the apartment which burned out that apartment and the one above causing a rent loss for two years rentals, the cause officially "Not fully ascertained, probably tenant's flexible wiring" and a total loss to owner-petitioner of approximately five thousand ($5,000) dollars, causing total disruption of petitioner's affairs at the time.

Simultaneously this tenant brought suit contrary to Sec. 11 (4) of the rent law for triple damages of rental overcharges based on the promised rent determination to be administratively provided.

On December 11, 1964 the New York City Rent District Director issued the promised order stating the rent to be controlled at $64.95 monthly. The court will be interested to know, no determination of operating cost was sought prior to this order, those operating costs were approximately $95/mth/apt.

The suit for damages was delayed in the courts, and a default order occurred on January 20, 1967 when petitioner's then attorney, failed to appear in court. By later agreement this default was suspended pending appeal. This appeal has been forced to continue herein. However, action to enforce collection by sheriff sale on January 20, 1970 was blocked, and an action to enforce collection by garnishee of rents was effected commencing March 1970. Consequently at this date the building deteriorates without incoming funds for operation and maintenance, and the mortgage is unpaid for the past eight months.

Action upon that mortgage foreclosure rests in the United States Second Southern District Court

of New York as Docket 70 CIV 3878, and lacking necessary court determination reflected from this presentment to this high court, will probably progress to this level with the same basic questions presented between different parties in a different manner.

Prior consideration of this apartment situation is:

> RENT ADMINISTRATOR'S STATEMENT of December 16, 1965 "Apartment No. 1 had been landlord-occupied for less than two years after the issuance of the certificate of eviction...." Credit appears to be given for October 4, 1955 thru September 15, 1957, a period of residence of one year forty-nine weeks, which more than meets the one year occupancy requirement.
>
> NEW YORK STATE SUPREME COURT, re: Art No. 78 proceeding "the record submitted herein is replete with inconsistencies in the landlord's chronological sequence... it clearly appears that the landlord deliberately made an effort to create an appearance of technical compliance ... in all ... failed to satisfy requirements of bona fide owner occupancy of the apartments ... denied ...."

This court may note that the record was inaccurate, and failed to support with evidence the claims of the administrator which were accepted by the court as proven in the absence of contest by petitioner, who had no knowledge of their submission. The statement of the court contradicts the stated finding of the rent administrator noted in the preceding paragraph.

The reference of the United States District Court hereto in 68 CIV 4984 is that the court finds the questions presented insufficient to justify federal trial, applying thereto an ex post facto, 1962 Provisions of Law.

Subsequent implied reference of the United States District Court relative thereto in 70 CIV 1011 is res judicata of the prior action.

Thus petitioner has met the conditions of law, and in consequence of administrative orders relative thereto, is being deprived of thousands of dollars investiture, and in effect denied the right to own rental property in New York City.

Constitutional Provisions Involved

Article 1, Sec. 9, Clause 3

> "No Bill of Attainder or ex-post-facto Law shall be passed."

Sec. 10, Clause 1

> "No State shall...; pass ..., ex-post-facto law, or law impairing the Obligation of Contracts, ..."

Amendment 4

> "The right of the people to be secure in their ..., houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches, and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly

describing the ... things to be seized."

Amendment 5

"No person shall be held to answer for a ... infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, ...; nor be deprived of ... property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use without just compensation."

Amendment 6

"In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of ...., and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, ..."

Amendment 8

"Excessive ... not ... required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted."

Amendment 9

"The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people."

Amendment 13, Section 1

"... nor involuntary servitude, except ... punishment for crime ..., shall exist within the United States...."

Amendment 14

"No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States, nor shall any State deprive any person of ...property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."

Provisions of the Emergency Rent Control Law of the State of New York Which Are Involved

REF: Abbott, 178th Session, October 1955, Vol. 2, Ch. 685, p. 1585

Section 2(2)(h) of the Act. EXEMPT FROM CONTROL

"Housing accommodations which are rented after April 1, 1953 and have been continuously occupied by the owner thereof for a period of one year prior to the date of renting; provided, however, that this paragraph shall not apply where the owner acquired possession of the housing accommodation after the issuance of a certificate of eviction pursuant to the Rent and Eviction Regulations within the two-year period immediately preceding the date of such renting, and provided, further, that this exemption shall remain effective only so long as the housing accommodations

are not rented for other than single family occupancy."

Section 16, of the Act, 1961

"Except for matters pending before the commission, no action or proceeding, civil or criminal, when this act as amended shall take effect, brought by or against the commission shall be affected or abated by the enactment of this act or by anything contained herein, no existing right or remedy of any character shall be lost or impaired or affected by such enactment."

(Reference of the above is to transfer of Administration and regulation from New York State to New York City, the law being based upon the Police Authority of the State of New York.)

Section 4 (8) — GENERAL AUTHORITY OF ADMINISTRATORS)

"The powers granted in this section shall not be used, or made to operate, to compel changes in established rental practices, except where such action is affirmatively found by the commission to be necessary to prevent circumvention or evasion of any regulation, order, or requirements under this act.

Section 11 (4) — ENFORCEMENT

"No person shall be held liable for damages or penalties in any court, or on any grounds, for or in respect for anything done or omitted to be done in good faith pursuant to

any provisions of this act or any regulation, order or requirement thereunder, not withstanding that subsequentially such provision, regulation, order or requirement may be modified, rescinded or determined to be invalid."

Argument

I.

THIS COURT SHOULD GRANT CERTIORARI TO DETERMINE WHETHER THE FACTS HAVE YET BEEN DISCLOSED AND INCLUDED IN THE RECORD AND THEREBY WHETHER PETITIONER HAS BEEN AFFORDED DUE PROCESS.

The central question of this lengthy and confused litigation is whether the facts have been properly included in the record, and whether that record has been properly considered and fairly determined according to the law. In the simple layman's language of this pro se petitioner, it has not been done. Petitioner is forced to present this action doubly disadvantaged; the first being that respondent Rent Administrators have created a record in secret, which petitioner has not been able to examine even by subpoena; the subpoena's having been quashed in petitioner's two actions in these federal courts, thus denying even that information. Petitioner further is a layman of limited legal knowledge and without legal experience or expertise, respondent hereto is an agency of government using the full facility of government, seeking to overwhelm petitioner, and whose effort hereto is directed to preventing disclosure of the record.

This court should note, that these questions now existent before the court, are by responsibility of law the specific assigned work to be performed by respondent in a lawful manner, and the question existent is whether respondent has performed as required. A paradox occurs, respondent is a quasi-judicial agency of government. The very agency who is defendant hereto has continually entered the courts to provide definitions and claims of and as expert in the law, as an agent of the court in this action against itself. The claim of petitioner is that the record has not been properly developed, yet that agency while keeping the record secret from petitioner has been able to insert its version of that record, and its interpretations thereto which have been accepted by every lower court as proven fact. Petitioner thereto has been limited to blind denial of the statements in the briefs of defense counsel, and denied opportunity to contest the presentment of the rent administrator. Petitioner has further claimed erroneous application of the provisions of law. There have been continual changes which are noted in all the books of law, the acts of petitioner in question occurred between 1955 and 1960, yet every prior court has accepted respondent's claim to proper usage of the subsequent changes of the law since 1962. The law itself has not been used by any prior court as the point of reference. All prior courts having accepted the incorrect and erroneous presentation of defense counsel instead.

These are the presumptive errors of the lower court based upon incorrect claims of the respondent, Rent Administration of the City of New York.

a. Four apartments were decontrolled under the

1955 law of the State of New York between 1955 and 1960 not Title Y, of N.Y.C. Adm. Code of 1962 and thereafter the control exemption was statutory, and confirmed by the New York State Rent Commission, and the records were closed.

The Rent Administrator of the City of New York did not consider an application thereto, since none could or did exist. By provision of law a notice of compliance did exist and was improperly classified by the Rent Administration of New York City for unspecified reasons.

b. The specific authority of the Rent Control Law of 1962 by Sections 4, 11, and 16 forbade the usage of that law in the manner of administrative application hereto. The applicable provision of law applying to all of petitioner's exemptions from the control provisions of the law derive from Section 2(2)(h) of the New York State Emergency Housing Rent Control Law amended 1955 and amended 1959. Further, should such provisions ever be caused to apply by statutory performance, there is a prohibition within the law against such retro-effective orders as the rent administrator has sought to invoke.

Further, whether to these exempted apartments, or to apartments generally, the rent control law assigns the rent administrator specific responsibility for maintaining rents at market rates. The available evidence of this date is that this consistently has not been done. Further it is a point which petitioner seeks to enter in the record, that it has not been done in his situation, but the exact in-

verse has been ordered by respondent.

c. Further, the authority supplied by the Rent Control Laws generally to the office of the rent administrator can not lawfully be exercised other than according to the precepts of law. The entire circumstance of this complaint is that the rent administrator has so intruded his personal opinion and prejudice into the performance of his duty that the concepts of law have not existed. This presents the question of DUE PROCESS OF LAW.

The procedures of due process of law may vary, and respondent investigating any question which is before this court was not required by statute to hold hearings. The procedures of DUE PROCESS however require the fullest possible determination of the facts, development of a true record, and enforcement thereto of the law.

Involved hereto is the rental money, and real property of petitioner, and orders of the rent administrator denying them must by Constitutional Law be limited to probable cause, which must be of record, and shall not cause involuntary servitude, abridge the immunity of citizens, or impair the validity of contracts.

The acts and orders of the rent administrator relative to Orders dated July 27, 1964, December 11, 1964 and December 16, 1965 set aside prior administrator's acceptance, statutory performance and statutory provisions of law, petitioner's sworn testimony and ignored and denied Sections 4, 11 and 16 of the New York

State Rent Control Law, effective as of those dates.

Further these orders by denial ruled that petitioner's sworn statements were perjury and fraud, thus collected rents were fraudulent and grand larceny, which is a felony in the State of New York, by not making the criminal charge which must place determination before the court, the rent administrator sought by his orders to hold petitioner civilly responsible for damages contrary to the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution, and infringing upon petitioner's rights as stated by the Fourth, Sixth and Eighth Amendments thereto.

All of the foregoing was done, solely on the rent administrator's "Opinion's."

Petitioner hereto, sought administrative hearings during this period, relative to such notices as he received. Although the rent administrator was the responsible agent for exposing the fact, hearings were denied. Petitioner was given no statement of the issues or questions of administrative uncertainty. (Respondent's counsel has referred to petitioner having been given opportunity to answer questions. This consisted solely of reply to questions specified by the rent administrator, without known purpose, and limited in content.) Petitioner was not informed of the cause, intent, or possible consequence of this alleged investigation.

Petitioner throughout this period between September 1963 and December 1965, during which respondent iniated and proceeded with his action

and issuance of orders, sought and was denied information specifying the issue(s) and/or to know the charges against him, the purpose of the proceeding, to know and examine the evidence and witnesses against him, and to answer and provide witnesses for examination. Thus the record is totally a secret creation of the New York City Rent Administrator.

The record accepted by the courts thus consists of nothing more than an allegation of respondent backed by his selection from available fact. There has been no determination acceptable to any judicial definition of fact. There has been no recognition of petitioners un-entered information thereto. There has been no question of the issues understood by petitioner and permitted answer; such questions as have been asked are detail to supply apparent prior conception and a facade of formality. By reference of respondent attorney's briefs, there is in the record sworn statement of respondent's investigators which is in error stating other than single family occupancy of involved apartments.

The statements purporting to be fact of record are in error. Petitioner has been granted no opportunity thereto in his own defense. No procedure has been provided to properly determine the fact. The administrative action is not consistent with the provisions of law, nor has any base of lawful authority been stated.

Petitioner submits therefore that due process of law has not been afforded his cause.

II.

THIS COURT SHOULD GRANT CERTIORARI TO PROPERLY DETERMINE WHETHER RES JUDICATA WAS PROPERLY CLAIMED BY RESPONDENT AND PROPERLY GRANTED AS A BASIS FOR DISMISSAL OF THE ACTION IN THE LOWER COURT.

Aside from the argument in Point I, which is that petitioner has not, as stated by the lower court been afforded due process, and thus is entitled to necessary procedure for correction, another question remains and should be answered.

Petitioner, having sought to comply with law, was approved in his acts by the original jurisdicial authority. Which was the New York State Temporary State Rent Commission in his decontrol exemption filings.

The rent administrator of the City of New York, using quasi-judicial police authority of the State of New York sought to supercede the prior approval of previous administrators, who had acted using the same authority.

The presentation before the New York Supreme Court failed to raise this issue for adjudication. Raised on appeal, the same court denied petitioner an opinion.

The question brought before the United States District Court in 68 CIV 4984 was that petitioner had complied with the law, and by the stated authority of law was denied the benefits thereof, petitioner of necessity sought to challenge both

the authority of the administrator and the authority of the law that the issue might be resolved. The essential finding of the court ignored the content of petitioner's question, simply stating that language of the case was similar to language in a prior case which challenged the law itself on a statutory provision, and further denying petitioner opportunity to subpoena records or trial dismissed the action as unsubstantial and insufficient.

This lack was specified in detail upon appeal, by the Appeals Court of the Second Circuit.

The action hereto in question 70 CIV 1011, for the benefit of the court dropped the similarity of language, the class challenge and the accent of question of the constitutionality of the involved law, seeking to draw the court's attention to the unconsidered core of the complaint. Which was and remains that petitioner has complied with the requirements of law and is denied by administrative action the provided benefits of law.

The respondent hereto, having used quasi-judicial police authority's now insistent that that authority shall dominate the courts. Demands on every possible ground that the court refuse to try petitioner's complaint.

Petitioner respectfully submits to this court that such a concept when applied in such a manner makes a mockery of law, a circus of the courts, and a bureaucratic autocracy of injustice of the instruments of authority, denying any process by which errors and mistakes of administrative officialdom may be disclosed for correction and redress. There are no simple procedures for

rectifying such errors of precedent. That the court should participate in obstructing correction is contrary to the purpose of the courts.

Petitioner, respectfully will not suggest corrective procedures, but with equal respect for the urgent needs of court propriety, asks this court to consider what the function of the court requires to effect its work. Petitioner believes the procedure and precedent to be faulty and incorrect.

III.

THIS COURT SHOULD GRANT CERTIORARI TO DETERMINE WHETHER THE NEW YORK CITY ADMINISTRATORS HAVE UNLAWFULLY SEIZED, CONFISCATED AND ASSIGNED THE LAWFUL PROPERTY OF PETITIONER WITHOUT CAUSE, WARRANT, OATH OR AFFIRMATION BY INDIRECTION, AND SOUGHT TO HIDE THIS FACT OF ILLEGAL SEIZURE.

Petitioner is in fact a victim of an error once entered in a bureaucratic record, without petitioner's knowledge, or opportunity of reply or correction, which has been hidden, and the record defended with all the power of government. The consequence being destructive in the most extreme of petitioner's affairs, finance, rights of ownership and redress.

Petitioner seeks of this court consideration of the facts speaking for themselves in the light of law. Prior consideration by responsible authority having been obfuscated by statements of precedent. The facts are not identical, nor are the circumstances. The minute differences apparent

in the law briefs represent grossly alien facts. Respondent has maintained his claim of what he recorded, there has been neither investigation by the prior courts of fact indicated in available information, or of the provisions of law as different from respondent's heretofore privileged claim.

The logic is simple. Either petitioner is being deprived of property as consequence of rent administrator's orders, or he is not.

The record indicates that petitioner is being deprived of rents, and in danger of foreclosure and loss of his entire investment. The sole deterrent to collection of adequate rents being the orders of the New York City Rent Administrator, and prior orders of the New York State Rent Administrator, and the denials of these rent administrators of required or requested rents.

This denial of rents is either lawful, or it is not within the limitations of lawful purpose; or it is not by lawful authority.

Petitioner has continually sought to demonstrate to the courts that the rent administrator(s) both exceeded their authority, and acted without authority of law to issue orders contrary to the provisions of law. The rent administrator has claimed vague precedents, vague mandates of law, alleged provisions of the law, and the authority of an ex-post-facto provision of law. The law itself has as yet not been used as reference.

The rent administrator has presumed the authority to order assignment of property other-

wise belonging lawfully to petitioner, and in doing so, must have lawful cause. No statement of cause has been advanced, and petitioner continually states that no such cause exists. The courts have not considered the question. Petitioner questions the warrant of seizure, since seizure there was. The order of the rent administrator ordered "Landlord's Report on Statutory Decontrol DR-...is revoked." No such revocation can be defined in law. There was therefore no "warrant." There has been no sworn order, or statement of fact indicated thereto by respondent. Therefore there is no oath or affirmation.

It is the fact of record, that the New York City Rent Administrator has provided no public record, has hidden procedures of determination, has substituted his opinion for judicial consideration, and has both denied petitioner administrative hearings, and obstructed disclosure before the court of all the foregoing.

Petitioner respectfully submits to this court, that the New York City Rent Administrator has not, as required of his office as the lawfully assigned function and responsibility of his position, made full public disclosure of fact surrounding his acts and orders relative hereto; has not acted in accordance with proper and lawful procedure; and has not acted lawfully; but instead has sought by secret misuse of the power of government and authority of law to unlawfully seize the rightful property of petitioner without cause, and without compensation; and further sought to hide his malfeasance by maintaining the information of public record secret, and preventing proper review of his activity by the courts.

IV.

THIS COURT SHOULD GRANT CERTIORARI TO DETERMINE WHETHER THE PUBLIC POLICIES AND ADMINISTRATIVE ACTS OF THE NEW YORK CITY RENT ADMINISTRATOR ARE CONSISTENT WITH THE SPECIFICATIONS, PURPOSE AND REQUIRED RESPONSIBILITY OF THE NEW YORK RENT CONTROL LAWS. THE QUESTION BEING HERETO INVOLVED, AND OF VITAL CONSEQUENCE TO THE WELFARE OF TWENTY MILLION RESIDENTS OF THE GREATER NEW YORK AREA.

The specifications and purpose of the Rent Control Law were designed during the manpower and material shortage of World War II, the purpose of these controls has continually been stated to prevent excesses and abuses and maintain a fair market in good health. The nature of the law is economic, and its functioning is to prevent free-market swings with supply and demand.

The conditions of wartime shortage are for the last fifteen years a market surfeit. The major element affecting the New York Housing Market economically is the Rent Control Law and Administration. Which no longer applies to the expensive housing costs, meeting only the circumstance of the lower cost housing, the higher rents having been exempted. The functional administration is such that an official study by the Rand Corporation indicates that while costs have risen at 6% annually controlled rents have risen only 2% annually. Original rents computed costs at 75%. Thus the stated increases are that rents have increased to 167% of 1945-levels and costs have

increased to 285% of 1945 levels. The resultant computation is now that rents equal less than 60% of costs, thus maintenance can only be affected by a loss approximately equal to received rents.

The purpose, provisions, and requirements have not been met. A consequence of this fact is that over three thousand properties involving over twenty thousand dwelling units are abandoned yearly by their owners. Hopelessness prevails among owners, the prior appeals to the courts in individual instances have almost universally been dismissed by the courts, and precedents established, which in the light of changed circumstance is in effect, an order of the court, to reverse the function of the law.

The presentment of the law is based on an emergency in housing, as a consequence of World War II, the major essentials thereby are now the continued malfunction of the Rent Control Law itself, and the population born during and shortly after the war now matured and requiring additional housing. Such a burden is not rightfully an emergency of war, or a cause of war as is politely alleged and accepted by the solons of the courts and Legislature. This existence of police authority which permits the prejudice, bias, and opinions of one political appointee, to supersede constitutional and common law as it affects the real wealth of approximately ten percent of our nation's population has placed excessive power within irresponsible political control of a few men.

The consequence is inevitable, on the pretext of public concern, the power and its use are continued in a manner detrimental to the national

welfare and public good. Further it must remain self-perpetuating and influentially corruptive, with seizure of private wealth and its dissemination controlled by the political leaders of government. The constitutional securities become interference, and must be set aside by authority and force. The function of the courts must become to enforce the dictates of the administrator, and a trap of harassment and obstruction to any opposition.

This circumstance describes the status of greater New York. The housing deteriorates, the living arrangements of the public declines. Tremendous fortunes are accumulated on miniscule investiture by parties politically "connected." Rightful ownership is forced into bankruptcy, and denied rightful petition and redress in the courts.

Petitioner submits to this court that such is his condition, the case is unusual only in that he has managed to sustain his legal battle to this degree. Petitioner also submits to this court, that lacking action of this court, no other responsible authority is sufficiently unattached politically or otherwise uninvolved through precedent and procedure to take any corrective action in the foreseeable future. Petitioner therefore seeks immediate and urgent action by this court.

Conclusion

FOR THE FOREGOING REASONS, THIS PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI SHOULD BE GRANTED AND UPON GRANTING CERTIORARI THIS COURT SHOULD VOID THE RULINGS AND ORDERS OF THE NEW YORK CITY RENT ADMINISTRATOR, AND PROVIDE SUCH OTHER RELIEF AS INDICATED.

Respectfully submitted,

s/ William J. Davenport
Pro Se

Appendix A

Order and Opinion Denying Protest

THE CITY OF NEW YORK
City Rent and Rehabilitation Administration
280 Broadway
New York 7, New York

Protest Docket Nos. CPLA 9638-9641

D.R.O. Docket Nos. 2AD 2248-51

- -X

IN THE MATTER OF THE PROTEST OF

WILLIAM J. DAVENPORT,

Applicant.

- -X

ORDER AND OPINION DENYING PROTEST

On January 11, 1965 the above-named applicant-landlord filed protests against orders issued on December 11, 1964 by the District Rent and Rehabilitation Director of the Bronx District Rent Office concerning the housing accommodations known as 575 East 168th Street, Apartments 1, 2, 5 and 6, Bronx, New York.

These protests are being determined pursuant to Section 2f (11) of the Rent, Eviction and Rehabilitation Regulations.

Order and Opinion Denying Protest

The Administrator has carefully reviewed all the evidence in the record and has considered this matter de novo.

Since the housing accommodations involved in the said protests are within a single structure and since there are common questions involved, the Administrator has consolidated the said protests for disposition.

The issue in this proceeding is whether each of the four subject apartments is eligible for decontrol.

The record shows that between October 15, 1957 and March 13, 1962, the landlord filed five decontrol reports (Section 9 (11), State Rent Regulations) alleging qualifying owner-occupancy as to five of eight dwellings located in the premises as follows:

Date of Filing	Apartment No.	Report Number
Oct. 15, 1957	1	DR-3974
Jan. 6, 1959	6	DR-5420
Jan. 6, 1960	5	DR-6643
Dec. 2, 1960	2	DR-7855
Mar. 13, 1962	7	DR-9261

Order and Opinion Denying Protest

Reported date of inception of landlord occupancy	Reported date of subsequent renting
Oct. 6, 1955	Sept. 16, 1957
Sept. 15, 1957	Dec. 15, 1958
Dec. 16, 1958	Jan. 5, 1960
Dec. 1, 1959	Dec. 1, 1960
Jan. 1, 1961	Mar. 5, 1962

On December 11, 1964, the District Rent Director issued orders rejecting the decontrol reports (Section 2f ([11]) and establishing maximum rents for four of these apartments (Nos. 1, 2, 5 and 6).

The District Rent Director accepted decontrol as to Apartment No. 7 (DR-9261) finding that this apartment was owner-occupied by the present owner for at least one year prior to March 5, 1962 within the meaning and intent of the pertinent section of the Regulations.

The above orders were issued on the basis of a physical inspection of the subject building as well as an examination of the reported records of the Consolidated Edison Company.

The physical inspection conducted by the District Rent Director on March 20, 1964, revealed that Apartments Nos. 1, 2, and 6 were occupied for other than single family occupancy. At the

time of inspection the landlord occupied Apartment No. 3.

The utility company records (supra) show that the landlord has maintained the following accounts:

	FROM	TO
Apt. 1	10/4/55	6/6/58
Apt. 2	1/7/70	Active as of 3/26/64
Apt. 3	3/2/62	Active as of 3/26/64
Apt. 5	12/23/58	1/7/60
Apt. 6	4/1/57	1/6/59
Apt. 7	6/1/60	9/6/62

In rejecting the aforenoted reports the District Rent Director found that:

> Apartment No. 1 had been landlord-occupied for less than two years after the issuance of the certificate of eviction, (Docket No. E-7883; February 2, 1955). It is to be noted that notwithstanding the fact that an account with the Consolidated Edison Company was opened in the landlord's name on October 4, 1955 for Apartment No. 1, the record shows that in April of 1957 (approximately 17 months later) the landlord had opened an account in his name for Apartment No. 6;

Apartment No. 2 was apparently owner-occupied for less than one year. The Consolidated Edison report shows the landlord's account for this apartment was opened on January 7, 1960 and was still active on March 26, 1964 while an account in the name of the landlord had been opened for Apartment No. 7 on June 1, 1960. The period of alleged owner occupancy of Apartment 2 is from December 1959 to December 1960;

Apartment No. 5 had apparently been occupied for less than the required period because the alleged period of occupancy (December 16, 1958-January 7, 1960) clearly overlaps the inception date of occupancy for Apartment No. 2 (December 1, 1959);

Apartment No. 6 was not occupied as a single family unit at the time of the aforenoted inspection of the premises. (Overlapping periods of utility services noted above re: Apartments 1 and 5.)

In protest, the landlord alleges that he has occupied each of the subject apartments for the appropriate period of time and that the subject apartments were, at all times, rented and occupied for single family occupancy.

Specifically, the landlord maintains that the apartments which are the subject of this protest were occupied by him according to the following schedule:

	FROM	TO
Apt. 1	8/15/55	9/15/57
Apt. 2	12/1/59	12/1/60
Apt. 5	12/16/58	1/5/60
Apt. 6	9/15/57	12/15/58

The landlord further contends that rejection of decontrol reports after the passing of between five and three years (when applicable) since the initial filing of the within decontrol reports creates an undue hardship upon the landlord.

After a careful consideration of the entire evidence of record, the Administrator is of the opinion that these protests should be denied.

As the inspector's report (supra) clearly shows, three of the subject apartments (Nos. 1, 2 and 6) were at the time of inspection occupied for other than single family occupancy. Such occupancy in contravention of the Rent Regulations mandates the recontrol of these apartments regardless of other factors which may or may not be consistent with the landlord's alleged right to decontrol thereof.

Concerning Apartment No. 1 the rejection of decontrol is properly based upon the fact that the subject apartment if in fact landlord-occupied was so occupied for a period of less than two years after the issuance of a certificate of eviction. Under the (State Section 9(11), and City)

Rent Regulations decontrol based upon landlord occupancy will not attach.

As aforenoted, the landlord's evidence discloses substantial inconsistencies regarding the correlation between the landlord's alleged occupancy and the utility services rendered to the landlord.

As shown by the Consolidated Edison Company reports, the landlord could not have occupied Apartments No. 1 and 6 at the same time within the contemplation of Section 2f (11) of the Regulations.

Landlord claims to have occupied Apartment No. 2 from December 1, 1959 to December 1, 1960, while the record shows that it was only on January 7, 1960 that a utility account was opened in his name for the subject apartment.

The record shows that as far as Apartment No. 5 is concerned the landlord appears to have had possession thereof and further appears to have shown occupancy thereof for the prescribed period of time. However, the Administrator is, on the basis of this entire record, of the opinion that the landlord has not established occupancy of the nature and extent contemplated by Section 2f (11) of the Regulations as qualifying it for decontrol as will appear (infra).

The landlord has alleged that since acquiring the title to the premises in 1955 he has occupied as his permanent home and residence no less than five of the eight apartments in these premises.

The only substantial and credible evidence submitted by the landlord in support of his position is consistent less with the claim of qualifying the landlord-occupancy than with the District Rent Director's finding of occasional occupancy and use of these accommodations for the production of rental income.

The record shows that throughout the entire period of this landlord's ownership of the subject building the landlord, as a professional seaman, has spent the major portion of his time at sea; that the landlord has utilized the apartments or portions thereof as a "stopping-off" place and has not occupied or intended to occupy them as his permanent residence or home. This latter fact becomes even more apparent from a consideration of the clear indication contained in this record that the landlord during the claimed periods of alleged owner-occupancy of any one of the four subject apartments had rented space in these apartments to a roomer or roomers with whom he would share occupancy.

For example, in reply to the District Rent Director's Notice of Commencement of Proceeding to Fix Maximum Rent, the tenant George Gowins stated as follows:

> "After sharing Mr. Davenport's apartment, as a roomer, friend, and fully both in his presence and absences at sea for over a year I rented the apartment from him when he moved to another apartment in the building. I first rented Apartment No. 1, on the Ground Floor of 575 E. 168 St. We agreed in late

August or early September of 1957 that I was to take the apartment when he vacated and would tenant the apartment within the terms of the Rent Control Law's definition of Single Family Occupancy. During the next 2 or 3 months until Mr. Davenport moved it was a private joke between us as to who was presently the Tenant and who the Roomer."

While it must be conceded that a merchant seaman, as many other persons whose profession or occupation requires long absences from home, is entitled to maintain a permanent home and residence, in the matter under consideration it is clear that the landlord herein did not maintain these various apartments as his permanent home. The landlord has merely attempted to use the availability of the apartments in this building in conjunction with his protracted absences from the premises as a device to create an appearance of qualifying landlord-occupancy without the intent to create the substance of such occupancy. The course pursued by the landlord cannot under all of the circumstances disclosed by the record be permitted to achieve a result that must in the Administrator's opinion be deemed to be in circumvention and evasion of the Rent Law and Regulations.

Decontrol of an accommodation following its occupancy by a landlord essentially contemplates the enhancement of the housing rental market. The mere appearance of qualifying landlord occupancy indicating eligibility for decontrol cannot be permitted to operate as a device to wrongfully

divest tenants of all of the protections of the Rent Law and Regulations or to obtain unwarranted rentals for the landlord.

To permit the result which the landlord seeks to achieve herein would be totally inconsistent with the purpose, intent and meaning of the Rent Law and Regulations generally, and of Section 2f (11) specifically.

Thus, on the basis of the entire evidence of record, the Administrator finds that this landlord's occupancy of the subject apartments does not fall within the purview, intent or definition of the owner-occupancy intended by the Regulations to provide a valid basis for decontrol.

The District Rent Director's orders are proper and should be affirmed.

Therefore, in accordance with the provisions of the City Rent and Rehabilitation Law, as amended, and the Rent, Eviction and Rehabilitation Regulations promulgated thereunder, it is

ORDERED, that these protests be, and the same hereby are, denied, and that the District Rent Director's orders be, and the same hereby are, affirmed.

ISSUED DEC 16 1965

s/ Hortense W. Gabel
HORTENSE W. GABEL
Administrator

Order and Opinion Denying Protest

I hereby certify that this is a true copy of an order issued on the above date.

s/ Joseph
(Certifying Officer)

Appendix B

Opinion of New York Supreme Court

(4/29/82)

N.Y.L.J. p. 18, col. 1

MATTER OF BERMAN--This is an Article 78 proceeding to review a determination of the rent administrator which revoked decontrol of four out of five apartments in the subject premises which contains a total of eight apartments. Petitioner does not contest the administrator's determination as to apartment number "2". Thus, this review concerns the respondent's revocation of decontrol status to apartments 1, 5 and 6 of the subject premises. The original decontrol of these apartments as filed for by petitioner was allegedly due to owner occupancy of five of the apartments beginning with 1955. The record submitted herein is replete with inconsistencies in the landlord's chronological sequence of alleged owner-occupancy of the various apartments. It clearly appears that the landlord deliberately made an effort to create an appearance of technical compliance with the rent law for purposes of decontrol by living in five different apartments over a period of seven or eight years. In addition, evidence adduced by respondent shows petitioner sharing several apartments with other tenants in the building in clear violation of the rent law. Moreover, the records of the Consolidated Edison Company disclose several inconsistencies in the landlord's version of the periods alleged to have been spent in owner occupancy of the various apartments. In all petitioner has failed to satisfy the requirement of bona fide owner-occupancy of the apartments in issue herein in order to

receive the benefits of decontrol under the rent regulations. Respondent's determination, therefore is amply supported by the record submitted and should not be disturbed. Accordingly the application is denied and the petition dismissed. Settle order.

Appendix C

Opinion of United States District Court

(Filed 7/28/69)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

- -x

WILLIAM DAVENPORT,

Plaintiff,

- against -

No. 36038

68 Civ. 4984

FREDERICK S. BERMAN, individually, and as Commissioner of Office of Rent Control, MARIE GAMBINO, individually, JOHN V. LINDSAY, MAYOR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, and COMMITTEE ON GENERAL WELFARE,

Defendants.

- -x

CANNELLA, J.

Motion by the plaintiff to convene a three-judge court and for injunctive relief, is denied.

Motion by the defendants pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) and Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted and for lack of jurisdiction, is granted.

Opinion of United States District Court

This is a class action challenging the constitutional validity of the New York City Rent, Eviction and Rehabilitation Law, hereinafter "Rent Control Law."[1]

Plaintiff identifies himself as a black person who owns a building at 575 East 169th Street, Bronx, New York and who is "burdened" by the "obstacle of rent control." He brings this action as a class action on behalf of himself and "other landlords of dwelling accommodations in the City of New York" which are subject to rent control, and on behalf of "tenants in rent controlled housing accommodations," and on behalf of "tenants in rent controlled housing accommodations," and on behalf of "tenants in over-occupied premises."[2]

The defendants are Frederick S. Berman, individually, and as Commissioner of Office Rent Control, "Marie Gambino"[3] individually, John V. Lindsay, Mayor of the City of New York, and Committee on General Welfare.

Essentially, plaintiff seeks the following relief: "Enjoining the defendants from enforcing or in any way implementing the Rent Control Law of the City of New York, or from taking any further action under authority claimed under said Rent Control Law; Enjoining the defendants from enacting any form of involuntary servitude of the plaintiff or any member of his class; Declaring Local Law Number 30 of the City of New York of

1. Title Y, Ch. 51 of the N.Y. City Admin. Code.
2. In view of the disposition of the case, the Court will not pass on the make-up of the proposed class.
3. Identified by answering papers to be Josephine Gambino.

1962 and all other Rent Control Laws and Regulations void and unconstitutional.' In connection with the requests for injunctive relief, plaintiff seeks the convening of a three-judge court to pass upon the various claims.

The defendants oppose the application in all respects and move to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted and for lack of jurisdiction, and, of course, for a denial of the application for a three-judge court on the grounds of insubstantial federal question.

With the exception of two areas, this complaint raises issues identical to the ones which were litigated in this district, and which resulted in the denial of an application for a three-judge court, the dismissal of the complaint for lack of jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim. Israel v. City Rent & Rehabilitation Administration of the City of New York, 205 F. Supp. 906 (S.D.N.Y. 1962). This Court denies the instant application for the same reasons, insofar as the application raises issues which have been decided in this district. The court in Israel, Pollack, J., found

> The constitutionality of the Rent Control Statute is well settled. The statute does not violate due process ... equal protection ... taking of property without compensation ... (or) impairment of contract rights ....
>
> No substantial federal question is presented as to the continuation of the emergency giving rise to rent control legislation. The determination to that effect by the City

Council, dated March 17, 1967, is not without basis in fact, nor is it arbitrary ....

Insofar as plaintiff seeks relief under the civil rights statutes from any government body or agency, the claim is barred. ...

No three Judge Court is required with respect to plaintiff's constitutional attack on the Rent Control Statutes. The enabling act specifically vested authority in the City of New York to operate Rent Control, and that program is operated entirely by officials of the City.

A three Judge Court is required to be convened only where an injunction is sought restraining enforcement of a state law by 'any officer of such state'.... A three Judge Court is not convened to consider 'local ordinances or statutes having only local application.' (citations omitted) Israel v. City Rent and Rehabilitation Administration of the City of New York, 265 F. Supp. 910, 911.

There are two additional issues raised by this complaint and the Court similarly finds them lacking in substantiality and dismisses the complaint as to those issues: a claim of discrimination under the Thirteenth Amendment on the basis of his black identification; and a claim of lack of due process in state proceedings to decontrol.

The Thirteenth Amendment claim suffers from the same infirmity as does the entire complaint; it is conclusory and fails to set forth any facts. In any event, the Supreme Court rejected a similar

argument in connection with prior rent control laws, and this Court rejects the argument as presenting an insubstantial federal question precluded by prior litigation. Marcus Brown Co. v. Feldman, 256 U.S. 170 (1921).

As to the claim of lack of due process of law with respect to the plaintiff's decontrol proceedings, the Court finds that the requirements of due process have been met by adequate proceedings and judicial review in the state court. Further, the Court determines that the complaint is without merit and lacks the substantiality requisite to the institution of a federal claim.

Accordingly, plaintiff's motion for a three-judge court and injunctive relief is denied, and the defendants' motions to dismiss are granted. The complaint is dismissed.

So ordered.

Dated: July 25, 1969
New York, New York

s/ JOHN M. CANNELLA
U.S.D.J.

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

For the Second Circuit

No. 345—September Term, 1969.

(Argued December 5, 1969 Decided December 29, 1969.)

Docket No. 34027

WILLIAM DAVENPORT,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

—against—

FREDERICK S. BERMAN, individually, and as Commissioner of Office of Rent Control, MARIE GAMBINO, individually, JOHN V. LINDSAY, MAYOR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, and COMMITTEE ON GENERAL WELFARE,

Defendants-Appellees.

Before:

WATERMAN, HAYS and FRIENDLY,

Circuit Judges.

Appeal from denial of application for three-judge court and dismissal of complaint attacking New York City rent control. Order of United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, John M. Cannella, *J.*, affirmed.

GERD CARSCHENEL, New York, N. Y., *for Plaintiff-Appellant.*

WILLIAM E. ROSEN, New York, N. Y. (Daniel W. Joy, Acting General Counsel, Office of Rent Control, Department of Rent and Housing Maintenance, New York City Housing and Development Administration, on the brief), *for Defendants-Appellees Berman and Gambino.*

IRVING GRAS, New York, N. Y. (J. Lee Rankin, Corporation Counsel, Stanley Buchsbaum, on the brief), *for Appellees Lindsay and Committee on General Welfare.*

PER CURIAM:

Challenging rent control in New York City,[1] plaintiff William Davenport brought suit against Frederick S. Berman, individually and as Commissioner of the New York City Office of Rent Control, John V. Lindsay, Mayor of the City of New York, The Committee on General Welfare, and Marie Gambino.[2] The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, John M. Cannella, *J.*, denied plaintiff's application for a three-judge court and dismissed the complaint. Davenport appeals and we affirm.

Appellant is a Negro landlord of a rent-controlled apartment house in the Bronx. The complaint and papers in opposition to defendants' motions to dismiss present a

---

1 See New York City Rent and Rehabilitation Law, N. Y. C. Adm. Code, Ch. 51, Title Y, authorized by Local Emergency Housing Rent Control Law, N. Y. Unconsol. Laws §§8601-17 (McKinney Supp. 1969).

2 We put to one side the inaccuracies in the papers; e.g., Marie Gambino is apparently the incorrect name for Josephine Gambino, a rent administration official.

variety of theories, including the averment that plaintiff sues as a representative of both landlords and tenants. As best we can make out, the claims still pressed in this court are as follows: (1) Rent control deprives Negroes of the equal enjoyment and use of property because black tenants are thereby kept in inadequate housing and denied the opportunity to be charged higher rents which would maintain decent housing for them; this also discriminates against Negro landlords. (2) The procedures for decontrol of apartments violate due process and were applied discriminatorily against Negro landlords, including appellant. (3) Rent control forces appellant into involuntary servitude.

To the extent that the complaint and papers allege loss of money or property rights, absent racial discrimination, they gave the district court no sufficient basis for determining that plaintiff's claim met the jurisdictional minimum of either 28 U.S.C. §1331 or 28 U.S.C. §1332 and did not meet the requirements of 28 U.S.C. §1343(3). See *Hagan* v. *Eastman*, slip op. 621 (2d Cir. Nov. 28, 1969). While the claim of discrimination might be covered by 28 U.S.C. §1343 (3), mere conclusory statements that rent control furthers racial discrimination, without supporting facts, are not sufficient. *Powell* v. *Workmen's Compensation Board*, 327 F.2d 131, 137 (2d Cir. 1968). The claim of involuntary servitude is frivolous. *Marcus Brown Holding Co.* v. *Feldman*, 256 U.S. 170, 199 (1921).

Judgment affirmed.

Appendix E

Opinion of United States District Court

(Filed 5/11/70)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

- -x x

WILLIAM J. DAVENPORT, :

Plaintiff, :

-against- :

CITY RENT and REHABILITATION ADMINISTRATION of the City of NEW YORK, JOHN F. LINDSAY, as Mayor of City of New York, :

Defendants. :

- -x x

TENNEY, J.

Plaintiff, appearing pro se, apparently seeks preliminary injunctive relief: (a) enjoining the enforcement of certain orders of the New York City Rent Administrator which reinstated rent controls on four apartments that had allegedly been previously decontrolled by certain action of the plaintiff taken in compliance with statutory decontrol procedures; (b) "Enjoining the City of New York and Department of Buildings from enforcement of any Multiple Dwelling Law, where violation may have been the consequential result of those orders"; and (c) "Enjoining the Civil

Court and Sheriff of the County of the Bronx from enforcing collection of damages by sale, or garnishee of rents or wages, judgments which are the direct consequence of those orders." Defendants, Office of Rent Control, a division of the Department of Rent and Housing Maintenance within the Housing and Development Administration of the City of New York, and Mayor John V. Lindsay seek an order pursuant to Rule 12(b) of the Fed. R. Civ. P. dismissing the complaint filed herein on the grounds that the claims raised are barred by the principle of res judicata and that it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Additionally, defendants seek an order pursuant to Rule 45(b) of the Fed. R. Civ. P. quashing a subpoena duces tecum served upon them by plaintiff on April 10, 1970 on the grounds that such subpoena is unreasonable and oppressive.

As so frequently appears when plaintiffs move pro se, the complaint filed herein is verbose and in large part inapposite to the legal redress sought, which the Court must struggle to discern. Cognizant, however, of plaintiff's limited resources and unfamiliarity with legal procedure, the Court has attempted to meet its obligations by a thorough review of the record.

It appears that plaintiff is the owner of an eight-unit apartment building located at 575 East 168th Street, Bronx, New York. In 1965, proceedings were opened by the District Office of the City Rent Administration to determine whether certain apartments claimed by plaintiff, as landlord, to be decontrolled were properly subject to the pro-

visions of the New York City Rent, Eviction and Rehabilitation Law[1] (hereinafter referred to as the "City Rent Control Law"). At these proceedings plaintiff was afforded an opportunity to answer and present relevant evidence. It was ultimately held that certain of the apartments in question did not qualify for statutory decontrol, but rather were subject to the provisions of the City Rent Control Law. Pursuant to applicable provisions of the City Rent Control Law, plaintiff took an administrative appeal from this decision by filing a protest to the City Rent Administrator. After issuance of an order denying his protest, plaintiff sought and obtained judicial review of the Administrator's final determination in the Supreme Court of the State of New York. The Supreme Court rejected plaintiff's contentions and found that he had "failed to satisfy the requirements of bona fide owner-occupancy of the apartments in issue herein in order to receive the benefits of decontrol under the rent regulations. Respondent's determination, therefore, is amply supported by the record submitted and should not be disturbed." Matter of Berman, N.Y.L.J., April 29, 1966, at 18, col. 1. This ruling was affirmed without opinion by the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court. Davenport v. Berman, 27 App. Div. 2d 903, 280 N.Y.S.2d 534 (App. Div. 1967).

Thereafter, plaintiff instituted a class action in this court challenging the constitutional validity

1. New York City Rent and Rehabilitation Law, N.Y.C. Adm. Code, Ch. 51, Title Y, authorized by Local Emergency Housing Rent Control Law, N.Y. Unconsol. Laws §§ 8601-617 (McKinney Supp. 1969).

of the City Rent Control Law. Named as defendants in that action were Frederick S. Berman, individually and as Commissioner of the Office of Rent Control, Marie Gambino (the incorrect name for Joseph Gambino, a rent administration official), Mayor John V. Lindsay and the Committee on General Welfare. Essentially, plaintiff in that action sought to enjoin the defendants from enforcing or in any way implementing the City Rent Control Law. In denying plaintiff's motion and granting the defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint, Judge Cannella upheld the constitutionality of the rent control statute and found plaintiff's claim of lack of due process of law with respect to the decontrol proceedings, also raised in the complaint therein, to be without merit. Specifically, the Court found that the requirements of due process of law had been met by adequate proceedings and judicial review in the state court. Davenport v. Berman, 68 Civ. 4984 (S.D.N.Y., filed July 28, 1969). Although this claim of lack of due process of law in the procedures governing the decontrol of apartments was raised on appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed Judge Cannella's order. Davenport v. Berman, Docket No. 34027 (2d Cir., filed Dec. 29, 1969).

However earnestly and forcefully plaintiff may argue his cause, I must conclude that "[t]o permit the maintenance of the present action would do violence to the wholesome principle of res judicata and its purpose to terminate litigation where parties have had full opportunity to be heard on the merits of their respective claims." Grattan v. Societa Per Azzioni Cotonificio Cantoni,

151 F. Supp. 813, 817 (S.D.N.Y. 1957), aff'd, 251 F.2d 343 (2d Cir. 1958). Even assuming that plaintiff has touched upon some additional argument in his present complaint, the prior decisions on the merits, which remain unmodified and involved the identical parties in the present suit, except for some slight change in names, foreclose relitigation of the adequacy of the administrative proceedings and state judicial review thereof, which is at the crux of the instant suit. United States v. Munsingwear, 340 U.S. 36 (1950).

Accordingly, plaintiff's motion for injunctive relief is denied and defendants' motions to dismiss the complaint herein and to quash the plaintiff's subpoena duces tecum are granted.

So ordered.

Dated: New York, New York.

May 11, 1970.

s/ Charles Tenney
U.S.D.J.

William J. Davenport, Plaintiff,

-against-

City Rent and Rehabilitation Administration of the City of New York, John F. Lindsay, as Mayor of the City of New York,

Defendants.

SUPREME COURT, U.S.
Supreme Court, U.S.
FEB 10 1971
E. ROBERT SEAVER, CLERK

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1970

No. 1149

WILLIAM J. DAVENPORT,

Petitioner,

v.

CITY RENT and REHABILITATION ADMINISTRATION of the City of New York, JOHN V. LINDSAY, as Mayor of the City of New York,

Respondents.

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO PETITION FOR CERTIORARI

J. LEE RANKIN,
Corporation Counsel
of the City of New York,
Attorney for Respondent
John V. Lindsay,
Municipal Building,
New York, N. Y. 10007.

DANIEL W. JOY,
General Counsel,
N.Y.C. Office of Rent Control,
Attorney for Respondent
City Rent and
Rehabilitation Administration,
110 Church Street,
New York, N. Y. 10007.
Tel. No. 566-5034

STANLEY BUCHSBAUM,
HARRY MICHELSON,
WILLIAM ROSEN,
IRVING GLENN,
Of Counsel.

Rule Press of Fremont Payne, Inc., 417 Canal St., N. Y.—966—1970

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Respondents.

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO PETITION FOR CERTIORARI

Statement

Petitioner's motion for a writ of certiorari seeks to review an order of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit dated September 24, 1970. That order, without opinion, dismissed the appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Tenney, J.) which had dismissed plaintiff's complaint.

Question Presented

Were any substantive or procedural rights of the petitioner denied when the Court of Appeals granted respondents' motion to dismiss the appeal predicated on a showing that the petitioner had unsuccessfully litigated the same issues in earlier litigation between the same parties?

Facts

The New York City rent control law grants exemption, with some exceptions, from rent control for apartments placed on the rental market by the owner after he has lived in the housing unit for at least one year. N.Y.C. Admin. Code, Sec. Y51-3.0, subd. e, para. 2, subpara. (i)(3). The question of a landlord's right to the exemption is usually one of fact.

Proceedings before the New York City Rent Administration several years ago resulted in findings that the petitioner Davenport was not entitled, as he had claimed, to decontrol of five separate apartments in a single building owned by him at 575 East 168th Street, Bronx, N. Y. Davenport took an administrative appeal, a protest, which was denied (A. 1a-11a). He then brought judicial review proceedings in the Supreme Court, New York County, which sustained the administrative determination (A. 12a-13a). The Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court, First Department, affirmed without opinion, *Matter of Davenport* v. *Berman*, 27 A D 2d 903, 280 N.Y.S. 2d 534. The Appellate Division decision was not further appealed.

Essentially, the same grievance was the basis for a new federal action by Davenport in which he asserted that rent control as a whole imposed burdens on both landlords and tenants. Davenport also asserted that, as a Negro, he was further aggrieved by the rent control law which he claimed

constituted a form of enslavement and discrimination. Davenport's complaint was dismissed in an order and opinion of Cannella, J., dated July 25, 1969 (A. 14a-18a). Davenport then appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, which affirmed the judgment of Cannella, J., in an opinion filed December 29, 1969 (A. 19a-21a), published at 420 F. 2d 294.

Undaunted, Davenport instituted the present third series of proceedings in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. With immaterial variations from his prior federal complaint, he again asserted that the rent control law and its particular application to him were unconstitutional. The complaint was dismissed by an unpublished order and opinion of Tenney, J., dated May 11, 1970 (A. 22a-26a).

Again, Davenport appealed to the Court of Appeals. Respondents moved under Rule 2 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure to dismiss the appeal "on the ground that the said appeal is frivolous and wholly without merit." The moving papers recited that earlier federal proceedings had terminated in a Court of Appeals decision and that the current action had been dismissed by the District Court with an express holding that the prior determination was *res judicata*.

The motion to dismiss, made about July 10, 1970, was not decided by the Court of Appeals until well after Davenport had filed his brief in support of his appeal on about July 29, 1970. In a brief order, without opinion, respondents' motion to dismiss Davenport's appeal was granted. The September 24, 1970 order is the subject of this petition for a writ of certiorari.

ARGUMENT

The appeal below was properly dismissed because the issue of constitutionality of rent control had been decided adversely to the appellant in prior litigation.

It is clear from the record that Davenport's attempt to litigate the constitutionality of the rent control law and its application to his circumstances is essentially a repetition of litigation he had engaged in unsuccessfully both in the federal courts and in the courts of New York. The doctrine of *res judicata* is a bar to such needless and repetitious litigation. *Angel* v. *Bullington*, 330 U. S. 183, 192 (1946).

The constitutionality of rent controls has been sustained by this Court against a wide variety of attacks over a long number of years:

Block v. *Hirsh*, 256 U. S. 135 (1921);
Marcus Brown Co. v. *Feldman*, 256 U. S. 170 (1921);
People ex rel. Durham R. Corp. v. *La Fetra*, 230 N. Y. 429 (1921), app. dism. 257 U. S. 665 (1921);
Bowles v. *Willingham*, 321 U. S. 503 (1944);
Twentieth Century Associates v. *Waldman*, 294 N. Y. 571 (1945), app. dism. 326 U. S. 697 (1946);
Woods v. *Miller Co.*, 333 U. S. 138 (1948);
Lincoln Bldg. v. *Barr*, 1 N Y 2d 413, 153 N.Y.S. 2d 633 (1956), app. dism. 355 U. S. 12 (1957);
Four Maple Drive Realty Corp. v. *Abrams*, 2 A D 2d 753, 153 N.Y.S. 2d 747 (1956), aff'd. 2 N Y 2d 837, 159 N.Y.S. 2d 976 (1957), app. dism. 355 U. S. 14 (1957);
I.I.F.Y. Co. v. *Temporary State Housing Rent Commission*, 10 N Y 2d 263, 219 N.Y.S. 2d 249 (1961), app. dism. 369 U. S. 795 (1962);

8200 Realty Corp. v. *Lindsay*, 27 N Y 2d 124, 313 N.Y.S. 2d 733, app. dism. —— U. S. ——, 91 S. Ct. 367 (Dec. 21, 1970).

No substantial issues, legal or factual, were presented below in this litigation.

CONCLUSION

The petition for certiorari should be denied.

February 9, 1971.

Respectfully submitted,

J. Lee Rankin,
Corporation Counsel
of the City of New York,
Attorney for Respondent,
John V. Lindsay, as Mayor
of the City of New York.

Daniel W. Joy,
General Counsel,
N.Y.C. Office of Rent Control,
Attorney for Respondent,
City Rent and Rehabilitation
Administration.

Stanley Buchsbaum,
Harry Michelson,
William Rosen,
Irving Genn,
of Counsel.

Supreme Court, U.S.
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In The

Supreme Court of the United States

October Term, 1970

No. 1149

WILLIAM J. DAVENPORT,

Petitioner,

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CITY RENT and REHABILITATION ADMINISTRATION of the City of New York, JOHN V. LINDSAY, as Mayor of the City of New York,

Respondents.

PETITIONER'S REPLY BRIEF TO RESPONDENTS' BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO CERTIORARI

WILLIAM J. DAVENPORT, *Pro Se*
324 Allaire Avenue
Leonia, New Jersey 07605
(201) 944-1174

LUTZ APPELLATE PRINTERS, INC.
Law and Financial Printing

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Respondents.

PETITIONER'S REPLY BRIEF TO RESPONDENTS' BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO CERTIORARI

Statement

Petitioner seeks a writ of certiorari to review an order of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit dated September 24, 1970 which without opinion dismissed his appeal from a lower court dismissal without trial of his complaint (Tenney, J.), in the United States District Court for the Second Southern District in New York.

The dismissal of the complaint in the lower court was based on "Res Judicata" of a prior

application to the court which had similarly been dismissed without trial or consideration of the issues on a procedural cross motion of respondent counsel.

Question Presented

All of the questions hereto involved seek to define the Police Authority limits of the New York Rent Administrators Authority, for each issue hereto presented petitioner has complied with the terms of the then effective Rent Control Laws, and the Rent Administrator has assumed authority to supercede the specifications of legislative provision therein, and has effectively superceded the constitutionally secured rights of petitioner, alleging that such is his authority under the involved Rent Control Law, which is a Police Authority Law of the State of New York.

Facts

The facts in this case are fully stated in the original brief of petitioner, the statement alleging to be fact presented in the respondents "brief in opposition to petition for certiorari" are a perverted misrepresentation, constructed by six experienced attorneys employed by the New York City government in the Office of the Corporation Counsel of New York, who are pivy to the full record, and individually fully aware of the involved law, specializing thereto as both agents of government and agents of this court.

Such deliberate misstatement of truth is not only an affront to the dignity of this court but is criminal fraud.

Argument

Point I

PETITIONER IS IN THIS COURT SEEKING CORRECTION OF ERRORS OF THE PRIOR COURTS.

These errors all appear to have originated, developed, and matured in the same manner. The courts have accepted the presentation of respondent counsel as proven truth from an agent of government, and have been betrayed by false presentation, which in effect was the accused rendering judgment upon himself, through his privileged position before the courts. The prior courts in no instance indicate cognition of the questions presented, or the evident facts of the case, however those courts are not here in question, except that this court should not be bound by the prior errors of other jurisdicial procedure.

Petitioner presents this brief solely to prevent a repetition of the same error, and seeks to point out these misrepresentations which are the sole presentation of the respondent brief:

(a) Respondents' "Question Presented" states that petitioner had litigated the same issue previously. The statement is an intentional falsehood, petitioner has sought to litigate the same questions previously, and been dismissed without trial on respondents' cross-motion. The questions were not considered on their merit by the court.

(b) Respondent seeks to imply applicability of

the "New York City Rent Control Law, N.Y.C. Adm. Code, Sec. Y-51-3.0.", which did not exist at the time of the exemptions or decontrolls of the subject apartments, which were decontrolled by statutory provision of the New York State Law between 1955 and 1960, and the New York City Rent Administration and Administrative code did not exist prior to 1962, and does not in fact apply.

(c) Respondent counsel falsely states that "Proceedings before the New York City Rent Administrator" occurred. In fact of record, all action was solely effected on the Rent Administrator's desk in secret. Usage of the term proceeding is a travesty on the law, the New York City Rent Administrator not only actively ordered procedures seeking adverse testimony, but denied petitioners request for a hearing that he might have opportunity to examine and answer the charges. Further, having initiated the facade with a "Notice of Commencement of Proceedings to Determine Fact", in which was stated the intended findings and orders to be made. Which finding and orders were subsequently issued.

(d) Respondents' allegation of the issue of argument, as the constitutionality of rent controls is the deliberate, intentional, contrived, contumacious lie, which respondent counsel has used previously to misdirect prior courts. Petitioner has in no complaint contested the principle of rent control on constitutional grounds, but of fact and necessity has contested administrative acts claiming authority of the constitution and the rent control law which are contrary to both.

Petitioner has preferred to raise the challenge on the constitutional grounds. Thereto; in petitioner's complaint, 68 CIV 4984, par. 38 reads:

> "That defendants' Rent Administration and Administrator have, for the past twenty-two years, been either criminally unaware of the requirements of law or incapable of complying with the requirements of law as needed, all of which creates a complete experiment at the expense of the public, which is contrary to the intent, spirit, word or purpose of the involved law, and in fact the law has not been administered and the benefits of the law have not been available to the first party interested, specifically the landlord of rent controlled property."

Further, in this instant action, 70 CIV 1011 a portion of page 1 reads:

> "This action arises before this court as an urgent appeal for the relief of law in that plaintiff has complied with the Rent Control Laws of the State of New York and is denied relief provided therein by Administrative action of the responsible authority...." (sic, the rent administrator);

further a portion of page 3 of the same document reads:

> "All of the foregoing, creates a pattern of actual existence of purposes effected contradictory to the intent of the Authority of the Rent Control Law, while the pattern created

also contains official recognition of maintenance of the housing market economy contrary to the requirements of law, and statements by the Administrative officials denying knowledge of what the market is, that they are responsible to effect and maintain."

(e) Respondent finally seeks to allege that "No substantial issues...." have been presented in this litigation. The blunt "gut" issue presented here is whether law is to be administered and maintained, and whether the courts will hear the complaints of the citizenry and protect them against misuse of government authority and power; or whether agents of government may perpetrate any public fraud, misusing as they chose the authority and power of government by simply falsifying the records, acting in secrecy, and denying openly visible fact of record to contravene the law with tacit approval of the courts. The question is crucial to the times; being misuse of police authority by agents of government for unintended and unauthorized purposes to repress the lawful acts of the general citizenry. It is a regretful but true fact of current history that otherwise decent segments of the American public are already in armed revolt.

It is also fact that petitioner is presently defendant in a secondary action relative to this complaint which is also in these federal courts as 70 CIV 3878, and which is a mortgage foreclosure action, developed in consequence of the hereto in contest Rent Administrator's orders; and relative whereto petitioner has suffered not less than thirty thousand dollars

loss and may suffer potential loss of several hundred thousand dollars.

The facts now available of record before this court, in this action, establish evidence of a conspiracy of total fraud, perpetrated by not less than six top level officials of the New York City Rent Administration, various subordinates, and at least eight attorneys from the office of the Corporation Counsel of the City of New York who have knowingly misrepresented both fact and law before the courts seeking to hide the crime.

Further such fraud is widespread, the findings of an official Rent Administration survey by the Rand Corporation of California indicate that rent control forces abandonment of over three thousand buildings annually. Petitioner estimates that over one billion dollars annually in real property is stolen in this manner. The publicly known and visible evidence is that Rent Administration policy seeks to destroy the economy of selected areas and properties for the purpose of forcing redevelopment as an economic necessity. The only benefactors are the land speculators' pivy to the plans of the city authorities. These include controllers of political graft, the "hot" money of organized crime, and the large politically-connected real estate interests including the agents of the Rockefeller fortune.

Petitioner has been approached between 1954 and 1962 by agents of Spectrom, Inc; Jayven Inc.; and D.O.H.C. Inc., which are real estate firms employed by the Governor of New York State, Nelson A. Rockefeller, seeking to purchase the hereto involved property. The reason became public knowl-

edge several years ago, that New York City plans to remove the nearby "Third Avenue El" and construct a "Park Ave. Subway," which will totally change the character of the area, and the land values will jump by ten to fifty.

Although the entirety of the foregoing is not before the court for judgment, it should be recognized as pertinent background of fact that the present action provides more than adequate justification for a maximum of concern by this court.

Conclusion

This court should grant certiorari, and with the most urgent speed examine the question and issue presented, in the most intimate detail possible, to determine and order correction of widespread abuse and criminal misuse of this authority of law.

Respectfully submitted,

s/ William J. Davenport
Petitioner, Pro Se
324 Allaire Ave.
Leonia, N.J. 07605

FILED
APR 2 1971
E. ROBERT SEAVER, CLERK

In The

Supreme Court of the United States

October Term, 1970

No. 1149

WILLIAM J. DAVENPORT,

Petitioner,

vs.

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Respondents.

PETITIONER'S BRIEF SEEKING REHEARING OF PETITION FOR WRIT OF CETRIORARI.

WILLIAM J. DAVENPORT, *Pro Se*
324 Allaire Avenue
Leonia, New Jersey 07605
(201) 944-1174

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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITEDSTATES
OCTOBER TERM 1970

No. 1149

WILLIAM J. DAVENPORT,

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Respondents.

- -

PETITIONER'S BRIEF SEEKING REHEARING OF PETITION FOR WRIT OF CETRIORARI.

- -

Statement

PETITIONER seeks rehearing of his petition for a writ of certiorari, and reversal of the ORDER without opinion, of this court denying his petition, which order was dated March 8, 1971. The purpose of this application is to obtain a first hearing of the original facts underlying this action, not in any manner to cause delay.

The actions hereto involved are:

Statement

(a) Dismissal without trial as "insufficient for federal trial" an original complaint 68 CIV 4984. Which in appeal was upheld, the higher court specifying the deficiencies of the complaint as presented.

The district court simultaneously dismissed the subpoena by which petitioner sought access to the records and statement of charges against him which he has never seen, or had stated to him.

(b) Dismissal without trial as "Res Judicata," the replacement action of the former complaint, stating the prior dismissal to be by definition "CONSIDERATION UPON THE MERITS" of the complaint. This court simultaneously dismissed petitioner's subpoenas by which he again sought the records necessary to proper presentation of his complaint to the court for consideration.

Appeal therefrom was similarly dismissed without trial, as a consequence of petitioner seeking to approach the court to obtain a hearing of court orders based upon false allegations of defense counsel. No reason thereto was given, although a secretary of one justice referred to extreme prejudice of the court.

There has been no full presentation of the complaint and record, there has been no consideration of the court of the merits thereto. There has been no answer to charges of petitioner, by respondent, except to claim rules of the court to cause dis-

missal of the action, and to falsely state or imply as to occurrences in other courts, which improperly influenced the sitting courts, being in every instance paraphrased in the court decisions.

Further there has been no Rent Administration hearings to determine the facts.

Further, petitioner seeks here to be relieved of penalties against him, where there is no charge placed against him, no infraction of law by him, no specification of law as alleged by respondent, and no authority of respondent under the law to so order the penalties. And where the responsibility for proper performance of function is specifically assigned by law to respondent.

Questions Presented

The first question NOW before this court is whether petitioner can obtain from this judicial system the first rudiment of justice, which is a proper hearing of his complaint; OR CONVERSELY, whether as a citizen in complete compliance with law he shall be denied by THIS JUDICIAL SYSTEM every protection stated in the Constitution which this nation has risked his life to defend.

A second question quiescent herein is whether petitioner who is BLACK, and who is hereto the victim of a politically directed fraud for racial reasons by agents of government using the authority and power of their offices thereto, has any defense within our governmental system.

A third question, already existent in the original brief, is whether petitioner shall be deprived of his real property and his rights to own property as specified by law, solely on unlawful orders of government agents, without cause, without charges against him, and without opportunity to be heard in his own defense.

Facts

IT IS FACT OF DOCUMENTED RECORD that relative to all questions of this complaint that petitioner is fully compliant with law, but is being penalized to the maximum conceivable in consequence thereto by assumed authority, upon assumed but false charges, according to assumed but non-existent specifications of law, by a police authority of the State and City of New York, without a first hearing to determine the facts.

IT IS A FACT OF RECORD that petitioner has continually sought statement of the charges against him and a hearing in which the facts might be lawfully determined, by every known procedure available in law for seven years and that as yet THERE HAS BEEN NO HEARING, or opportunity given him to answer, presenting and examining evidence and witnesses under oath.

IT IS A FACT OF RECORD that in every prior proceeding, the record and administrative charges have been kept secret from petitioner.

IT IS A FACT OF RECORD that every prior court has EVIDENCED acceptance of the RE-

Facts

SPONDENTS' ALLEGATIONS as petitioner's complaint, paraphrasing them as its decision. NO COGNIZANCE of the actual complaints of petitioner has been expressed by any prior court. It appears that the courts have taken shortcuts which deny true perspective.

IT IS A FACT OF RECORD that there has been NEITHER TRIAL in these FEDERAL COURTS, nor has petitioner been permitted to present his complaint in full, the courts denying him access to essential public records kept secret by respondent. Nor has respondent actually answered the statement of charges presented.

Therefore there is no basis for the finding of the District Court of "Res Judicata," where there has been no full presentation, no consideration thereupon, and no decision relative thereto.

(It is presumptive and redundant but necessary of petitioner to inform this court that Res Judicata refers to a "prior decision after consideration of the merits," which no record can show in these presentments to the courts.)

This COURT IS ASKED TO TAKE COGNIZANCE of the following true and essential facts, with prior and personal knowledge of the patterns of American racial injustices and the present moment of history.

(a) This true fact of motive cannot be proven, but: Petitioner is a Negro, whose life was risked under fire as a Merchant Marine Radio Officer

in this nation's defense, present at Normandy on D-Day of WW 2, and torpedoed shortly thereafter. The papers have sought to present a truth which is that this entire situation is a fraud, created by political machination and motive, with a purpose of destroying petitioner's potential of BLACK LEADERSHIP, and simultaneously steal his real wealth and security for the benefits of the political-criminal perpetrators thereto.

(b) BUT PROVABLE OF DOCUMENTED RECORD is that the entire series of allegations by respondent fraudulently claims specification of law, authority of law, and facts of record. Further that every reply of respondent attorney to the courts has in some manner misdirected the court by fraudulent statements of prior occurrence, or the issue involved.

(c) The effect of these unlawful orders; supported by the courts consistent refusal to provide petitioner adequate opportunity to present his claims and necessary proofs in a first hearing where he is informed of the charges against him and given opportunity to answer, presenting and examining evidence and witnesses under oath; denies him both the right of ownership of real property, and any right of peaceful petition for redress in the courts. In simple fact, this procedure DENIES PETITIONER DUE PROCESS OF LAW AT LEVEL.

(d) A consequence of such administrative politically directed policy involving racial eth-

nics in New York City is obvious in an examination of the changes of ownership percentages of the real property known as "Harlem," where during the past fifteen years approximately one out of three black owners has been forced to expire, reducing the ownership percentage of that land area from approximately 58% to approximately 37%.

What is less visible is the financial-sociological destruction of these enterprising members as a community leadership class has, which is completely inverse to the normal traditional American-Democracy independent middle-class responsible members of community development, by which the ethnic groups normally enter the mainstream of American life. And also unseen, is the damage to the ethnic group, and the consequent damage to the major social system.

(c) It can be shown of record, that this racially oriented, political and criminal misuse of the authority of government is a total fraud, hidden in bureaucratic files and maintained by the entire machinery of government. In which petitioner has been ordered deprived of real property with a potential value of greater than Two Hundred Thousand ($200,000.00) Dollars, which represents twenty years of his labor and investiture, the security of his family, and his savings toward his own support in future years. That this has been done as a stated penalty where no charges have been stated, by an agent of government who has no

authority of his office to so order, alleging specifications which do not exist of a law which was created subsequent to the act alleged. And which police authority orders were given retro-effectivity to supercede both the prior administators' approvals and statutory provisions of previously existent law.

Further every every legal allegation presented the courts by defendant, upon which the courts have found against plaintiff-petitioner hereto, has been either a fraudulent misrepresentation, or undue favoritism granted by the court to a representative of government, which bias determined the issue.

All this has been done solely because petitioner is a BLACK REPUBLICAN, who has refused to act as a blackface ward-runner for the New York City Reform Democrats in an intra-party fight between New York City Hall and the Bronx Regular (Buckley) Democratic Party.

(f) This court might note these historical continuances of this petitioner's life (1) at age ten in 1934 petitioner was refused membership as a negro in the local YMCA and thus could not learn to swim in the "Y" pool, (2) at the age of twenty in 1944 petitioner, as Merchant Marine Radio Officer on the SS Ezea Weston, participated in the D-Day invasion of Normandy, the vessel being struck during that invasion by shellfire, and later torpedoed, with petitioner a survivor therefrom. (3) At

age thirty in 1954, petitioner unable to locate suitable employment as consequence of being an ex-officer and BLACK purchased the involved building seeking to establish his own business. (4) At age forty in 1964, this fraud by political agents of government seeking to steal his property was begun, in consequence petitioner has at this date been forced into functional bankruptcy, with the property in foreclosure and receivership. (5) At age fifty in 1974 the decision of this court to include him within the scope of law or exclude him therefrom will determine his status.

(g) This court should recognize that this petitioner is a highly unusual representative of the major mass of small property owners in New York City, the remainder thereto either having been forced into bankruptcy or discouraged by the continually negative attitude of the courts to examine and relieve their just complaints. And further, that the entire housing market of New York City shall be affected by this court's decision in this action.

(h) This court should also recognize the currently spreading use of Rent Control Laws in other states and areas, and the ultimate effect which will be excessive political control of the wealth of the citizenry.

Argument

Petitioner is entitled to a hearing of the issue, that a proper judgment of law based upon the facts may be made. The record can show no such hearing in which these issues have been clearly stated, and evidence and witnesses examined under oath. This court is the last resort, and denial of this petition constitutes the tacit approval of this court for the grossest misuse of government authority, denying this petitioner any availability of the protection of law.

Conclusion

This court should grant certiorari, and with urgent speed examine the questions and issues herein in the most intimate detail possible, ordering criminal prosecution of petitioner if he is guilty of the fraud for which he is herein civilly penalized, or correction of the injury done him if the respondent is guilty of the criminal misuse of his office herein charged by petitioner.

Respectfully submitted,

s/ William J. Davenport
Attorney Pro Se
324 Allaire Ave.
Leonia, N.J. 07605
(201) 944-1174